A better version of the "luxury belief" theory
Temperament correlating with politics is a much more satisfying explanation
A month ago I wrote a critique of Rob Henderson’s concept of luxury beliefs. This was quite a popular essay, so I thought I’d revisit it in light of what I consider a better and more accurate theory from writer
.My initial annoyance with the “luxury belief” concept was triggered by the fact that it had become a sort of conservative version of the “oppressor/oppressed” framework, at least in public discourse. But when I looked at it more closely, I discovered it wasn’t just misused, but actually had some foundational flaws. I will briefly summarize my objections to the concept:
Elites have not "replaced" material signalling with belief signalling. Signalling with non-material goods has always happened and I am not even sure there is so much evidence these ratios have changed in recent years, as Rob implies. I could accept that material signalling has been replaced with a more generalized form of “success signalling”, at least in the US, but not with belief signalling.
There is a mishmash of libertarian positions and far left positions in terms of what counts as "luxury beliefs", which is really misleading and confusing.
The language around luxury beliefs has this conspiratorial, 4D chess mentality baked in. In my post I argued most people do not choose their beliefs by carefully calculating ex ante how policies derived from those beliefs would affect them. That would make no sense because, as
points out, paying lip service to a policy does not actually carry any cost. Rather, people, even elites, adopt ideas mostly due to mood affiliation and the prevailing “vibes” within the group they are part of. Keeping that in mind, I argue that, when elites have bad ideas, they are better understood as being “lazily well-intentioned” rather than malicious.
But “Luxury Beliefs” is very popular. Usually, when multiple people resonate with an idea, it’s because there is some truth to it. I believe I have found this seed of truth behind the luxury belief concept through a post (that cites Rob) by Helen Dale. As
puts it, “Her main point is that we find an ideology congenial when it benefits someone with our personality type.” I like this framing because it does not imply that elites do this uniquely: I am sure lower socio-economic class people also prefer ideologies that are more in line with their temperaments. It also does not rely on the empirically false idea that this a new phenomenon, as the initial “luxury beliefs” theory suggests. But it does allow for the observed reality that what elites prefer ends up dominating discourse at the expense of what the median person is inclined towards. This is not down to some conspiracy, but simply because elites can impose their preferences on others, often unconsciously, by occupying positions of influence in areas ranging from journalism to policy making. It also solves the problem of the fact that luxury beliefs encompasses so many conflicting ideologies, ranging from far left to libertarian ones. If you are a low conscientiousness, high neuroticism elite, you are going to be attracted to far left ideologies, while higher conscientiousness elites might be more classically liberal. If certain temperaments are overrepresented among the elites, for whatever reason, then ideologies that resonate with them will have an advantage, regardless of what the public thinks.By turning the luxury belief concept much more general, Helen’s “temperamental theory of politics” (let’s call it this way), also makes it more accurate. As we have learned from the replication crisis, banal and obvious isn’t a bad thing in the field of social science. Indeed, this “temperamental theory” is actually supported by quite solid empirical evidence.
I would, however, add some observations to Helen’s point:
Firstly, I would argue that she still overestimates the extent to which people choose ideologies that “suit them” in a calculated manner1. Rather, it’s more of an instinctive and vibes based attraction: someone neurotic/ low conscientiousness might prefer defunding the police even when that does not benefit them, simply because it really resonates to their personality in a very sentimental way. Indeed, there is evidence this is the case. I think that for evolutionary reasons we should expect there is a correlation between what we are inclined to believe instinctually and what is objectively good for us, but that correlation is not perfect. I really want to emphasize that the direct mechanism through which we form beliefs is much more instinctive than she suggests. And it makes sense: most elites want to be good people, but our temperaments shape how we think of what “good” and “bad” experiences are. For example, someone who is extremely non-neurotic might consistently underrate how bad situations that involve high degrees of uncertainty are for other humans. They might have politics that reward risk-taking, not simply because they think it will benefit them, but rather because they unconsciously underestimate how uncomfortable others might feel in such situations. In other words, their conception of good is tied to how much risk one can take in a way that cannot be easily undone.
To illustrate this: let’s say two friends are both temperamentally suited for classical liberalism, but one of them ends up being in a more stable situation financially and emotionally (life circumstances that mean he won’t be as affected by too much freedom) for luck-based reasons. My prediction would be that the friend with the more classically liberal temperament will support such ideas more, regardless of material circumstances.
Second, it’s not clear to me that elites supporting ideologies that are in line with their temperament is always a bad thing. We can bash classical liberalism all we want, but it also led to the great enrichment of everyone, the lifting of many people out of poverty and so on. This is something I struggle to conceive of as a bad thing but hey, maybe it’s just my temperament speaking!
As the header sentence: “Political ideologies tend to suit the people who promote and believe them, and not suit others.” suggests.
The truth of "luxury beliefs" is not that people are calculating whether policies would benefit them or whatever. It's more that people are capable of taking ridiculous positions when they're completely sheltered from the reality. They have the luxury. Think "defund the police" - the people living in crime-ridden neighborhoods never wanted the police defunded, but rich white people in 99% white New England cities and attendees of universities which have their own security sure did. Think about the border - the people who live in border states want to secure the border; it's rich white people in New England that were falling all over themselves to declare themselves "sanctuary cities" right up until Texas started shipping busloads to them. They have the luxury of being able to take positions that are objectively destructive because the consequences will not affect them. That's what is really going on with the utterly ridiculous "luxury beliefs" that western elites hold. They've become detached from reality.
This doesn't engage with Henderson's main objection to "elite beliefs," which is specifically the observation that they *don't* correspond with temperaments.
Henderson's prime example was his observation that elite college students were almost always the products of stable nuclear families, but considered the institution of marriage, and nuclear-family-oriented social norms, to be retrogressive and wrong. According to Henderson, many of the same students themselves planned to get married and establish a traditional nuclear family, but outwardly, their belief was that such norms were damaging to society.
The students in this case were genetically and environmentally predisposed towards a family-desiring temperament, they were observed to actually have this temperament in regards to their personal plans, and yet their stated beliefs indicated the opposite. I don't think the luxury beliefs thesis is right, but the temperament thesis cannot be true because it fails to deal with the primary motivating observation.